Trustworthiness Attribute NetworkUserTW

URI: NetworkUserTW

Description: Trustworthiness of users with access to an abstract or logical network subnet.

This attribute is undermined by the misbehaviour LossOfNetworkUserTW

Base class for all network subnets, including real subnets (i.e. those over which messages can be sent or routed) and some that are not real but represent a set of (inferred) real networks and routers.

H.L.IoH.3

Remote user access from AttackerSubnet via LogicalSubnet to insecure device Host: an attacker with access to AttackerSubnet gains access to host Host via an unprotected service listening on LogicalSubnet .

H.L.NoH.3

H.M.IoH.3

Remote root access from AttackerSubnet via LogicalSubnet to insecure device Host: an attacker with access to AttackerSubnet gains access to host Host via an unprotected yet privileged service listening on LogicalSubnet .

H.M.NoH.3

H.M.RIoH.7

Remote root access from AttackerSubnet via LogicalSubnet to back door on device Host: an attacker with access to AttackerSubnet gains access to host Host via a previously installed back door providing a reverse shell via LogicalSubnet .

H.M.RNoH.7

I.O.HIoH.3.1

Remote DoS attack from LogicalSubnet on Host: an attacker with access to subnet LogicalSubnet sends too many messages to the network address of the connected target device Host.

I.O.IoH.3

Remote DoS attack from AttackerSubnet on Host connection to LogicalSubnet: an attacker with remote access to Layer 3 subnet LogicalSubnet sends too many messages to the network address of the target device Host on LogicalSubnet.

I.O.LoH.3

Adjacent DoS attack on Host from LogicalSubnet: an attacker with access to Layer 2 subnet LogicalSubnet sends too many messages to the hardware address of a target device Host connected to that subnet.

I.O.RoH.3

CC.AuA.CCAPNaS.1

Network access to service Service as Client from LogicalSubnet: an attacker with access to subnet LogicalSubnet can send messages to service Service, exploiting a privileged network path through firewalls used by client Client. This allows anonymous access to vulnerabilities or backdoors in Service.

CC.AuA.OCAPNaS.1

P.L.CSAPNaS.3

Remote control of service Service using a back door from LogicalSubnet: an attacker with access to LogicalSubnet can exploit a privileged network path to Service via that subnet, and use a previously installed back door to take control of the service, gaining access to the rights of Service on SHost.

P.L.OSAPNaS.3

P.O.DoS.3

DoS attack on service Process from subnet LogicalSubnet: an attacker with access to LogicalSubnetcan exploit a privileged network path through firewalls allowing access to service Process, sending too many messages and overloading Process. The best defence is to manage and restrict the traffic sent to the service at one of the inbound network interfaces (check threat causes for unrestricted network interfaces).

SC.C.ImSCf.3

Snooping client-service communications by spoofing subnet LogicalSubnet to Host: if an attacker can spoof physical network LogicalSubnet to Host, they can intercept client-service communications sent via LogicalSubnet from Host.

HC.C.ImHCf.3

Snooping virtual subnet communications by spoofing subnet LogicalSubnet to Host: if an attacker can spoof physical network LogicalSubnet to Host, they can intercept virtual communications sent via LogicalSubnet from Host.

LS.L.LSoLS.1

Access to LogicalSubnet allows access to OverlaySubnet: if subnet OverlaySubnet is an overlay on LogicalSubnet, then an attacker with access to LogicalSubnet can also access OverlaySubnet.

LS.L.VSPSH.1

Using admin rights at Gateway to enable access to LogicalSubnet from PhysicalSubnet: if someone has control of device Gateway providing virtual subnet LogicalSubnet, and access to the underlying physical subnet PhysicalSubnet, they can connect their own device to the virtual subnet.

LS.L.VSPS-HP.3

Access to virtual subnet LogicalSubnet via physical network PhysicalSubnet: if an attacker has access to physical subnet PhysicalSubnet, they connect to virtual subnet LogicalSubnet routed over PhysicalSubnet, unless prevented by security measures.

LS.L.VSPSH-P.3

H.V.IoH.2

Remote authenticated exploit on device Host from AttackerSubnet via LogicalSubnet: an attacker with access to the subnet AttackerSubnet can send a malicious message via the network to device Host via LogicalSubnet that, after authentication, can exploit a vulnerability in Host.

H.V.IoH.3

Remote anonymous exploit on device Host from AttackerSubnet via LogicalSubnet: an attacker with access to the subnet AttackerSubnet can send a malicious message via the network to device Host via LogicalSubnet that, without authentication, can exploit a vulnerability in Host.

H.V.LoH.2

Adjacent authenticated exploit on device Host from LogicalSubnet: an attacker with local access to device Host when connected to subnet LogicalSubnet can send a message containing malicious content that, after authentication, can exploit a bug in Host.

H.V.LoH.3

Adjacent anonymous exploit on device Host from LogicalSubnet: an attacker with local access to the subnet LogicalSubnet to which device Host is connected can send a message containing malicious content designed to exploit a bug in Host, without authentication.

H.V.NoH.2

H.V.NoH.3

H.W.HIoH.3

Remote malware exploit on device Host from LogicalSubnet: an attacker with access to subnet LogicalSubnet sends a message containing malicious content designed to exploit a bug in Host and install itself there, without authentication.

P.V.CCCSACvLS.2

Adjacent authenticated exploit as Client on service Service from LogicalSubnet: an attacker able to authenticate as client Client and access Service via an adjacent subnet LogicalSubnet used by Client can send a message with malicious content that, after authentication, can exploit a bug in Service.

P.V.CSAPNaS.3

Remote anonymous exploit on service Service from LogicalSubnet: an attacker with access to a subnet LogicalSubnet can use a privileged network path to service Service and send a message containing malicious content that, without authentication, can exploit a bug in Service.

P.V.OSAPLaS.3

Adjacent anonymous exploit on service Service from LogicalSubnet: an attacker with access to a subnet LogicalSubnet can exploit firewall policy exceptions enabling access to service Service and send a message containing malicious content that, without authentication, can exploit a bug in Service.

P.V.OSAPNaS.3

SC.A.HuCAPmSC.6.2

Suspended channels from Client to vulnerable service Service via LogicalSubnet are not available: the firewall rules allowing access by client Client to service Service may be disabled if the risk of an expoit by an attacker on subnet LogicalSubnet is too high. . However, this cuts privileged network paths, so communication between Client and Service via that subnet will become unavailable.

SC.A.HuSAPmSC.6.2

Suspended channels to vulnerable service Service via LogicalSubnet cuts availability: the firewall rules allowing access to service Service via LogicalSubnet may be suspended if necessary to prevent attacks. However, this cuts privileged network paths, so communication with Service via that subnet will become unavailable.