Trustworthiness Attribute ChannelConfidentiality

URI: ChannelConfidentiality

Description: Applies to a network or a communication channel between processes, signifying that messages cannot be intercepted and read in that network or channel.

This attribute is undermined by the misbehaviour CommsSnoopable

AbstractSubnet	Base class for all network subnets, including real subnets (i.e. those over which messages can be sent or routed) and some that are not real but represent a set of (inferred) real networks and routers.
ConnectionChannel	Base class for client-service connection assets.
HostChannel	Represents a physical network path between physical hosts that is used to route traffic in a virtual subnet, underpinning a Virtual Channel.

CC.AuC.CACSScS.3.3

Possible access to Process as client Client by snooping credentials between Client and authenticator Service: if service Process redirects clients to service Service for authentication, an attacker able to snoop the token issued by Service may be able to impersonate Client to Process before Client does the same, even if the credential is limited to a single use. Note that this does not necessarily mean they can access service Process, only that the client credentials are compromised.

CC.AuC.CCC-nS.3.3

Password snooped between Client and Service: if a communication path used by client Client at service Service is subject to snooping, and the client uses a password (or other reusable secret) to authenticate to the service, the password can be snooped, allowing impersonation of Client to Service.

CC.C.CCCSCSoAC.3

Communications intercepted between Client and Service: if a network communication path used by Client and Service is subject to snooping, then communications between Client and Service can be intercepted.

DF.C.AC-iDF-VCS.3.3

Snooped flow of data Data from FlowsFrom to FlowsTo between Client and Service: if communications between Client and Service are subject to snooping, the snooper could read data Data flowing from FlowsFrom to FlowsTo.

DF.C.AC-iDF-VSC.3.3

Snooped flow of data Data from FlowsFrom to FlowsTo between Service and Client: if communications between Service and Client are subject to snooping, the snooper could read data Data flowing from FlowsFrom to FlowsTo.

SC.A.HuSC.6.3

Suspended insecure path from Client to Service affects availability: firewall rules allowing access by Client to service Service via a network path may be suspended where communication on that path is exposed to snooping. However, this means the availability of Client-Service connections using this network path will be reduced if its communication security is under threat.

SC.C.LSmSC.3

Snooping client-service communications in subnet LogicalSubnet: If an attacker has access to messages crossing subnet LogicalSubnet, they can intercept client-service communications that follow a network path via that subnet.

HC.C.LSmHC.3

Virtual network communications snooped in physical subnet LogicalSubnet: if network traffic can be snooped in subnet LogicalSubnet, then this also applies to virtual network communications sent via this subnet.

LS.C.LSoLS.3

Passive snooping in OverlaySubnet via LogicalSubnet: if subnet OverlaySubnet is an overlay on LogicalSubnet, then an attacker who can snoop messages sent over LogicalSubnet can also snoop messages in OverlaySubnet.

SC.C.VSHCmSC.3

Snooping client-service comms subnet VirtualSubnet between LocalHost and RemoteHost: If an attacker can snoop at the physical layer between LocalHost and RemoteHost, they can intercept client-service comms in virtual subnet VirtualSubnet that go between those physical hosts.