Threat H.V.CHS-iP.3

Indicates that threats from as well as to the space Space can be ignored, i.e. that the risk model intentionally does not consider physical attacks from Space. This is only permitted if Space is the inferred global public space (the World) used when no locations are asserted in the model. This control strategy is a way to specify that physical security is out of scope for devices with no explicitly specified location(s), i.e. that they are considered physically secure.

Use a systematic procedure for regular security patching of software used (including hosted processes) on device Host, and have a contingency plan included in the system operating policies and practices for HostManager to manually apply patches immediately should the need for them become urgent.

Represents a situation in which software patches have been applied manually by HostManager to eliminate vulnerabilities in device Host. This strategy represents activation of a contingency plan at runtime, and can be selected to discover what effect this would have on risk levels, allowing this to be used for decision support calculations. Note that this should only be considered if a suitable software patch is available. To implement this at runtime, signal the responsible user HostManager. Then deselect the SoftwarePatched control and restore the asserted Extrinsic TW levels of Host once the update has been confirmed.

The physical space Space is patrolled at frequent intervals to ensure it is free of intruders. Note this does not prevent intrusion, e.g. to steal a device, but it does prevent some types of attacks where the intruder would need uninterrupted access, e.g. use of a device in the space for a significant period.