Threat DF.Auth.HDCDF.0

URI: DF.Auth.HDCDF.0

Package: DataLifecycle

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Description: Cached flow of data Data from FlowsFrom to FlowsTo altered on Host: if the flow of Data from FlowsFrom to FlowsTo is cached on Host, and an attacker is able to tamper with the cache, the data flow will be affected. This is a secondary threat whereby changes to the cache propagate to the data flow - the attack will be what caused the cache to lose authenticity.

Threat Type: Secondary Threat

Matching Pattern:

MP-HDCDF

Finds a Data Flow for which there is a Data Cache on the Host of a sending or receiving process.

Triggered by Threat (1)

DF.IS.PDFFA.8

Flow of Data from FlowsFrom to FlowsTo is in service: if process FlowsFrom is in service and able to access the data, and all the steps in the chain of processes between FlowsFrom and FlowsTo are in service, then the flow of Data from FlowsFrom to FlowsTo will be in service and potentially subject to attack, unless disabled.

Triggers Secondary Threats (4)

DF.Auth.PDFIDADFI.0

Unauthentic data Data from FlowsFrom forwarded by Process to FlowsTo: if the flow of data Data from process FlowsFrom to process Process is unauthentic, so is the forwarded flow to FlowsTo.

DF.Auth.PDFODADFO.0

Unauthentic data Data from FlowsFrom forwarded by Process to FlowsTo: if the flow of data Data from process FlowsFrom to process Process is unauthentic, so is the forwarded flow to FlowsTo.

DS.Auth.HPDFDADS.0

Flow of unauthentic data Data from FlowsFrom is stored by data service Process: if the flow of data Data from FlowsFrom to Process is unauthentic, then so will be the copy saved locally on device Host by Process.

Se.Auth.SePDsFF.0

Loss of authenticity at sensor Sensor: if the onboard data received from a sensor by any client is altered by an attacker, it is modelled as a loss of authenticity at the sensor.