Misbehaviour DeputyConfusion

URI: DeputyConfusion

Package: ProcessComms

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Description: The client is influenced by a malicious actor who is able to induce the client to send malicious requests to its service.

This misbehaviour affects the trustworthiness attribute DeputyUserTW

ClientChannel

Represents a trust relationship between a Client and a Service. Exists where the two communicate directly, or where the Service may need to know the identity of the Client.

        (empty)

DeputyConfusion
DF.Auth.CCCSDF-VCCS-i.3

Flow of data from/via Process forged by compromised client Client via confused deputy Service: if client Client does not send data Data to its service Service, it is still possible to inject false content into the data flow via service Service using a confused deputy attack. The attack itself is responsible for the upstream loss of DeputyUserTW (see threat causes).
DeputyConfusion
DF.Auth.CCCSPDF-VCCS-i.3

Flow of data from/via Process forged by compromised client Client via confused deputy Proxy: if client Client is compromised or impersonated, and does not send data Data via its service Proxy, it is still possible to get the data indirectly using a confused deputy attack via Proxy and Service. The attack itself is responsible for the upstream loss of DeputyUserTW (see threat causes), in this case propagated by at least one reverse proxy.
DeputyConfusion
DF.C.CCCSCCSDF-Vi.3

Flow of data from/via Process leaked to compromised client Client via confused deputy Service: if service Service does not send data Data to its client Client , it is still possible for the client to request the data flow using a confused deputy attack against Service. The attack itself is responsible for the upstream loss of DeputyUserTW (see threat causes).
DeputyConfusion
DF.C.CCCSPCCSDF-Vi.3

Flow of data from/via Process leaked to compromised client Client via confused deputy Proxy: if client Client is compromised or impersonated, and does not receive data Data from its service Proxy, it is still possible to get the data indirectly using a confused deputy attack via Proxy and Service. The attack itself is responsible for the upstream loss of DeputyUserTW (see threat causes), in this case propagated by at least one reverse proxy.