Matching CCCSPDF-VCCS-i

URI: MP-CCCSPDF-VCCS-i

Description: Finds a client accessing a proxy that (directly or indirectly) uses a service that uses a second service, where the client is not authenticated by the second service, with a data flow not encrypted with keys from a vault, flowing to the second service from the first but not from the client, plus the associated client channels.

Root Pattern: R-CCCSPDFCCS

R-CCCSPDFCCS

Finds a client accessing a proxy that (directly or indirectly) uses a service that uses a second service, with a data flow to the second service from the first, plus the associated client channels.

(empty)

DF.Auth.CCCSPDF-VCCS-i.3

Flow of data from/via Process forged by compromised client Client via confused deputy Proxy: if client Client is compromised or impersonated, and does not send data Data via its service Proxy, it is still possible to get the data indirectly using a confused deputy attack via Proxy and Service. The attack itself is responsible for the upstream loss of DeputyUserTW (see threat causes), in this case propagated by at least one reverse proxy.

Matching CCCSPDF-VCCS-i

R-CCCSPDFCCS

Construction Patterns (0)

Threat Patterns (1)

DF.Auth.CCCSPDF-VCCS-i.3